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Legal authority agencies have to tailor primary legislation based on shifts 
in legal precedent, as is the norm in case law. In the first instance, the 
question presented before the District Court of the District of Columbia in 
the Chris van Hollen case was whether the Federal Election Commission 
(‘FEC’) exceeded its statutory authority by promulgating a regulation that 
narrowed the disclosure rules of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act 
(‘BCRA’), 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(2)(E) and (F). This case presents what 
appears to be the original instance of whether an agency may promulgate 
regulations that modify existing law to fit changed circumstances. 
Particularly, it calls into question whether an agency may narrow a 
statutory provision with the purpose of addressing a change in the statute’s 
breadth prompted by the legal precedent established through a Supreme 
Court ruling. 
The court upheld the legal precedent of Pennsylvania Dept. of 
Corrections v Yeskey, according to which “the fact that a statute can be 
‘applied in situations not expressly anticipated by Congress does not 
demonstrate ambiguity; it demonstrates breadth”.1 It further upheld that 
“unambiguous statutory text is not rendered ambiguous simply because the 
statute has been called upon to govern unforeseen circumstances”.2 
The circumstances of the case reported here are as follows: Congress 
enacted the BCRA as an amendment to the Federal Election Campaign Act 
(‘FECA’) in 2002 and, under the terms of the statute, persons who make 
disbursements to fund electioneering communications are subject to certain 
reporting obligations. The BCRA requires every ‘person’ who makes 
disbursements for the direct cost of producing and airing electioneering 
communications to disclose the following: 
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“(E) If the disbursements were paid out of a segregated bank account 
which consists of funds contributed . . . directly to this account for 
electioneering communications, the names and addresses of all 
contributors who contributed an aggregate amount of $1,000 or more 
to that account . . .; or  
(F) If the disbursements were paid out of funds not described in 
subparagraph (E), the names and addresses of all contributors who 
contributed an aggregate amount of $1,000 or more to the person 
making the disbursement during the period beginning on the first day 
of the preceding calendar year and ending on the disclosure date”. 
Initially, the BCRA prohibited corporations from making electioneering 
communications unless they met strict criteria (section 203). However, the 
Supreme Court’s decision in FEC v Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc (‘WRTL’) 
held that this prohibition was unconstitutional.3 Thus, following the WRTL 
precedent, corporations and labor organisations were permitted to make 
expenditures for electioneering communications that did not constitute 
express advocacy or its functional equivalent (WRTL ads).4 
In 2010, the Supreme Court invalidated the prohibition on the use of 
corporate and union treasury funds to finance electioneering 
communications in Citizens United v FEC.5 However, the Court upheld 
section 201 of the BCRA – the sunshine provision – because “the public 
has an interest in knowing who is speaking about a candidate shortly before 
an election.”6 
On December 26, 2007, the FEC, in order to implement the Supreme 
Court’s decision in WRTL, promulgated the regulation 11 C.F.R. § 104.20 
(c) (9), which provides for disclosure: 
“If the disbursements were made by a corporation or labor 
organization pursuant to 11 C.F.R. § 114.15, the name and address of 
each person who made a donation aggregating $1,000 or more to the 
corporation or labor organization, aggregating since the first day of 
the preceding calendar year, which was made for the purpose of 
furthering electioneering communications.” 
The first rationale behind this rule was that corporations and labor 
organisations may have funding sources other than donations, and that 
those persons may not support the corporation’s electioneering 
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communications.7 The second rationale was that “the effort necessary to 
identify those persons who provided funds totaling $1,000 or more to a 
corporation or labor organization would be very costly and require an 
inordinate amount of effort.”8 
U.S. Rep. Christopher Van Hollen Jr. (plaintiff) filed a lawsuit on 
April 21, 2011 and alleged that the regulation promulgated by the FEC, 11 
C.F.R. § 104.20(c)(9), fails to comply with federal law as it violates the 
Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) and (C). The 
lawsuit argued that the agency exceeded its statutory authority, as the new 
regulations are incompatible with the disclosure scheme set forth in the 
BCRA. 
The Hispanic Leadership Fund (‘HLF’) and the Center for Individual 
Freedom (‘CFIF’) moved to intervene, and on August 1, 2011, the Court 
granted these motions under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 24(1) as of 
right. 
On March 30, 2012, the U.S. District Court for the District of 
Columbia (‘District Court’) granted the plaintiff’s motion for summary 
judgment, denying the FEC’s cross-motion for summary judgment and also 
denying intervenor-defendant Hispanic Leadership Fund’s motion to 
dismiss and intervenor-defendant Center for Individual Freedom’s cross-
motion for summary judgment. 
The District Court concluded that the plaintiff’s challenge to the 
regulation promulgated by the defendant (FEC) defining the disclosure 
requirements for corporations and labor unions that fund electioneering 
communications, 1 C.F.R. § 104.20(c)(9), is contrary to the disclosure 
regime set forth in the BCRA, 2 U.S.C. § 434, specifically, subsections 
(f)(2)(E) and (F) thus invalid on the grounds that the agency exceeded its 
statutory authority, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(C). 
The District Court concluded that Congress did not delegate 
authority to the FEC to narrow the disclosure requirement through agency 
lawmaking, and that a change in the reach of the statute brought about by a 
Supreme Court ruling did not render plain language to be ambiguous. 
Therefore, the agency “cannot unilaterally decide to take on a 
quintessentially legislative function”.9 
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The District Court reviewed the disclosure requirement for 
corporations and labor unions embodied in the FEC’s regulation under the 
APA and applied the Chevron doctrine. 
The District Court first examined whether Congress had directly 
spoken on the precise issue. Based on the agency’s claim that the 
promulgated regulation was appropriate because the Supreme Court’s 
decision in WRTL rendered the statute ambiguous, the District Court 
concluded that the agency did not respond to a direct delegation of 
lawmaking, but specifically undertook its legal authority to adapt the 
statute due to the changed circumstances. 
Then the District Court examined whether the FEC’s regulation was 
in accordance with the plain meaning of the statutory text itself. Applying 
the traditional statutory canons, the District Court found that the statutory 
language was clear and unambiguous and held that the text is not rendered 
ambiguous simply because the statute has been called upon to govern 
unforeseen circumstances.10 
Furthermore, the District Court identified the original intent of 
Congress, which was to increase transparency on all undisclosed 
expenditures and accordingly it found incompatible the FEC’s regulation 
with that intent. Finally, it held that the delegation according to 2 U.S.C. § 
437d(a)(8) “to make, amend, and repeal such rules . . . as are necessary to 
carry out the provisions of this Act” does not apply when an agency limits 
the reach of the statutory provision.11 
The case reported above is an illustration of the application of the 
Chevron doctrine. The case shows the increasing statutory effect of 
secondary legislation. Considering the nature of campaign finance 
legislation, court intervention was necessary to eliminate loopholes 
permitting secret donations. 
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